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Abstract 
 In this article I outline two divergent visions of a post-carbon future 
which I label ‘climate capitalism’ and ‘ecological democracy.’ These models are 
necessarily simplified and incomplete, serving as rough ideal types that can help 
us make sense of policy choices with regard to climate change as decisions 
laying the foundations of our future societal development. Decisions taken now 
direct us along one path, often making other directions more obscure, 
inaccessible, or unthinkable. The outcome of each junction in the interplay of 
social forces opens and forecloses future possibilities for action within a given 
time frame. Some outcomes are easily overturned, others are ‘definitive’ for a 
generation or more. In the context of global warming and related ecological 
crises, what we humans choose to do within the next ten years can be expected 
to have irreversible consequences for many future generations.  
 Notwithstanding the potential for capitalists to invent and commodify 
new ‘post-carbon’ technologies or to invent eco-system service-based 
commodities, questions are posed about the ecological sustainability of a mode 
of production that relies upon ever-expanding growth in material and energy 
through-puts. Is capitalism, ultimately, unthinkable in a steady-state system of 
production and consumption? Can capitalism dematerialize while wage-labour 
continues to define the mode of production? Or, as many in the global climate 
justice movement believe, will a just solution to global warming require far-
reaching transformations of the global capitalist economic and social order? 
Will the properties of the renewable energy technologies that we are currently 
able to envisage (solar, wind, geothermal, tidal, hydro-electric, conservation, 
etc.) resist monopoly ownership and control and underpin more decentralized 
and democratic communities? These are questions with which the left is 
grappling in every context, including in Alberta, where an unprecedented 
opportunity for change opened up with the election of the New Democratic 
Party in May 2015 following many decades of government by conservative 
parties. In the first part of this article I outline, in general terms, emerging post-
carbon visions or models of development. In the second part, I shift the focus of 
analysis to the observable sign-posts and possibilities for post-carbon transition 
in the Alberta context.   
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Global contestation for humanity’s future in the context of global warming 
 
Over the last twenty years there has been a convergence of anti-globalization 
movements with environmental struggles, as reflected in the framing of climate change as 
a global ecological crisis linked to neo-colonialism and neoliberalism, and in the new 
political ontology of ‘fossil capitalism,’ ‘petro-capitalism,’ ‘carbon colonialism,’ ‘carbon 
capitalism,’ ‘carboniferous capitalism,’1 ‘climate justice,’ ‘ecological debt,’ ‘peak oil,’ 
‘decarbonisation,’ and ‘post-carbon development.’ This crisis, as never before, 
demonstrates the limits to capitalist accumulation in the forms it has taken since the 18th 
century.   
 While much attention has been paid to this junction as one of technological 
transformation, much less thinking has been done about the kinds of social relations that 
may be realizable in the ‘post-carbon’ era. As Timothy Mitchell observes in Carbon 
Democracy (2011), the transition from wood to coal in the industrial revolution resulted 
in the creation of large aggregations of wage-labourers and their communities and the 
development of powerful union movements and a unifying class culture in the early 
industrializing countries. Workers in the mining and transportation sectors were able to 
exercise substantial economic power to secure better terms for wage-labour as well as 
democratic reforms. Oil production, in contrast, required fewer workers for extraction 
and transportation, although pipelines were vulnerable to sabotage. Oil, transported with 
relative ease across great distances, fuelled the Fordist era’s rapid industrialization and 
rates of growth. The declining cost of oil (until the 1970s oil price shocks) generated the 
perception that economic growth faced no resource limits (Mitchell 2011, 139-40). The 
Keynesian framework of national economic management and indicators—importantly, 
the concept of gross national product (GNP) introduced in the USA in 1944—measured 
the input of capital and labour but did not account for resource depletion or 
environmental costs. Indeed, Mitchell argues that the ontological concept ‘the economy’ 
arose in the 1930s-1940s in association with ‘innovations in methods of calculation, the 
use of money, the measurement of transactions and the compiling of national statistics 
[that] made it possible to imagine the central object of politics as an object that could 
increase in size without any form of ultimate material constraint’ (2011, 143).  
 Growing global acceptance, since the 1980s, of the science of climate change has, 
however, given new meaning and renewed urgency to the 1970s predictions of limits to 
                                                            
1 This term is thought to have been introduced by Lewis Mumford (1932), but has re-entered our political 
lexicon in the 21st century. 
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economic growth. Even investment consultants are now calculating the date of arrival of 
‘peak fossil fuels’ (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2016; CDP 2013; Carbon Tracker 
Initiative and Energy Transition Advisors 2016). This term no longer refers—like ‘peak 
oil’—to the inevitability of resource depletion (US Department of Energy 2005) or 
recession-inducing oil prices (Rubin 2009), but rather to the rapid improvements in the 
efficiency and cost of renewable energy alternatives and to the increased penalization of 
greenhouse gas emissions that are expected to make fossil fuels unprofitable within 25 
years (Bloomberg NEF 2016). Solar power, in particular, is expected to meet a large share 
of global electricity demand. The global energy corporations are already factoring carbon 
price estimates and growing market shares for renewable energies into their investment 
decisions (Darby 2016; Pashley 2015; Shell 2016; Total 2016).   
The critical questions facing us are what the future mix of energy sources means 
in terms of social relations of production, and whether the gradual transition envisaged 
by some leading oil and gas producers will be sufficient to prevent a rise in global 
temperature of more than 1.5 °C above the pre-industrial level (1750).2 The so-called 
‘market-based’ approaches to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) (mainly 
carbon pricing) that are preferred by neoclassical economists, business leaders, and 
governments have so far failed to bring about reductions on the scale that scientists tell us 
are necessary. Atmospheric CO2 levels were measured at just above 400 ppm in May 2016 
(Thompson 2016). According to a report prepared by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat (2016), global CO2eq emissions 
were estimated at 52.4 gigatonnes (gt) in 2015, and they will have to be reduced to no 
more than 34 gt by 2030 and 14.2 gt by 2050 if Earth is to have a greater than 50 per cent 
chance of staying below a 1.5 C temperature increase (53). The ‘intended nationally 
determined contributions’ submitted to the UNFCCC prior to the Paris Conference of 
the Parties to the convention (CoP) in December 2015 will not, however, produce the 
necessary reductions.   
 As for the social relations of production associated with future ‘technological 
frameworks’ (Buck 2007),3 multiple paths appear to be open, although we can expect the 
pressures for commodification to be powerful.  Fossil fuels made possible rates of growth 
and production of surplus-value that had not been seen before the late eighteenth 
century. By the mid-twentieth century, oil was replacing coal due to its properties of 
storability, transportability, and high energy return on energy invested (at least for 
conventionally extracted oil), and its use as a transportation fuel. The German ecological 
economist, Elmar Altvater, believes that it is ‘impossible to power the machine of 
capitalist accumulation and growth with “thin” solar radiation-energy. It simply lacks the 
                                                            
2 A ceiling of 1.5 °C is the Paris CoP target, considered less risky than the 2C ceiling. 
3 Buck argues that capitalism has driven radical transformations in ‘base technologies’ and their associated 
leading industries since the early industrial revolution. 
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potential of time and space compression, which `thick’ fossil energy offers’ (2007, 45). 
Moreover, in Altvater’s view, a solar revolution will require not only new technologies, 
but also new ‘social forms beyond capitalism’ -- ‘a radical transformation of the patterns 
of production and consumption, life and work, gender relations and the spatial and 
temporal organization of social life’ (54). This view is shared by many on the green-left, 
such as the signatories to Canada’s LEAP manifesto (April 2015), a set of high-level 
principles to guide social movement and political programs. The manifesto states that ‘the 
time for energy democracy has come; we believe not just in changes to our energy 
sources, but that wherever possible communities should collectively control these new 
energy systems.’4 
 Many green radicals envisage a solar age in which more goods and services are 
produced on a local or regional basis, while reliance on global supply chains (fuelled 
largely by oil) is substantially reduced.  Renewable energies as well as climate change 
adaptation work are expected to generate more jobs than capital-intensive oil extraction, 
even if these jobs are less richly paid than those of oil-field workers. Likewise, increased 
local production of value-added goods and of food are expected to generate sustainable 
livelihoods. Smaller scale, diverse production for regional markets may lend itself to co-
operative and petty-commodity forms of ownership. This vision does not negate an 
important role for the state (albeit a democratized state) in creating the regulatory 
framework and in directing investment in ways that support ecological restructuring and 
social justice imperatives. 
 Another, more dystopian vision is presented by Daniel Buck, for whom it is not 
unthinkable that capitalists will assert control over new technologies. Even renewable 
energies may be subject to centralized production by large corporations, depending on 
the scale of the technologies and infrastructures that are developed to produce and 
distribute electricity. Large oil and gas corporations are already diversifying their 
investments by purchasing capacity in the wind and solar energy sectors. Moreover, a 
shift to a post-carbon regime of accumulation may happen in a highly uneven fashion 
around the globe, with a greening of capitalist production taking place earliest in parts of 
the global north, while ecological catastrophes have the worst impacts, at least initially, in 
regions of the global south. Altvater also recognized such a possibility in a 1998 essay in 
which he spoke of a trend toward ‘global apartheid.’  Buck reminds us that future 
technologies and modes of regulation could be both ecologically harmful and 
authoritarian. Indeed, some capitalist solutions to the depletion of conventional oil 
reserves have already pointed in that direction (hydraulic fracturing, deep-water drilling 
for oil and gas, exploration of indigenous territories in remaining rainforest zones, 
projects to drill in the Arctic, carbon offset schemes that dispossess indigenous 
communities of traditional land use). Technologies like carbon capture and sequestration, 
                                                            
4 https://leapmanifesto.org/en/the-leap-manifesto/#manifesto-content. 
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or geo-engineering schemes to suck carbon from the atmosphere or alter the chemical 
composition of the atmosphere or the oceans are being developed by corporations with 
massive state subsidies. 
 
Post-carbon capitalism 
 
 Some political economists (Newell and Paterson 2010; Sapinski 2015) have begun 
to identify the outlines of an emerging ‘climate capitalism.’ Jean-Philippe Sapinksi (2016, 
89-90) defines climate capitalism as: 
 
a regime of capital accumulation founded on climatically benign 
production technologies and increased energy efficiency. Developed 
within the bounds of neoliberal environmentalism (see Castree 2010), 
climate capitalism is founded on market mechanisms, mainly carbon 
trading and carbon taxes. The hope is that pricing access to the 
atmosphere’s sink capacity will foster the technical innovations needed to 
make ‘low emissions’ production technologies and energy generation cost 
competitive, so thus move investments away from fossil fuel dependent 
commodity production (Böhm and Dabhi 2009; Newell and Paterson 
2010). 
 
Key players in the articulation of such a regime include the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, the European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy 
Future, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (USA), Global Climate Forum 
(Germany), Copenhagen Climate Council, and The Climate Group (UK), among others. 
There is, of course, a range of responses to the climate crisis from the large corporate 
emitters —from the attempts on the part of Exxon-Mobil or coal company executives to 
discredit climate science, to the public proclamations of the executives of Royal Dutch 
Shell, British Petroleum, and Total of their support for action on climate change 
(Saeverud and Skjaerseth 2007; Skjaerseth and Eikeland 2013; Skjaerseth and Scheurs 
2013; Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2009).   
 Let us accept that a growing number of members of the global corporate elite view 
climate change as a serious threat to the well-being of future generations, or, at the very 
least, that they recognize that this is now the political consensus among governments and 
publics and that they must respond in some fashion to citizens’ demands for the 
decarbonisation of capitalist economies. While environmentalists are provoked to clash 
swords with the climate change deniers and to expose their ‘petro-turf’ networks, another 
--more subtle and complex -- game is being played out among corporate elites, 
government decision-makers, financial institutions, and policy consultants located in 
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think-tanks, ENGOs, and academic venues.  In this game, there is a large degree of 
consensus about the privileging of ‘market-based’ and technological approaches to the 
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions. Although the language used to characterize 
these approaches reproduces neoliberalism’s uncritical deference to markets and market 
actors, the policies in fact rely substantially on regulatory frameworks legislated by 
governments as well as public subsidies. The central message, however, is that the global 
climate crisis will be managed by government-corporate partnerships in which 
governments rely heavily upon corporations’ investment decisions and technological 
innovation.  
 A more expansive characterization of the emerging climate capitalism includes 
these elements: 
 
• Carbon needs to be priced (by means of government-legislated taxes or emissions 
trading systems) in order to incentivize GHG emitters to reduce their emissions. 
However, in the absence of a global carbon price, governments must set carbon 
prices at levels that do not trigger capital flight on the part of large emitters who 
can relocated investment to lower (carbon) cost jurisdictions. Thus, as in all 
market-based approaches, environmental targets are a function of acceptable rates 
of profit (given the opportunities available to mobile capital), rather than a 
function of the ecological imperatives identified by best available science.  
• The financialization of carbon and the invention of other commodities (ecosystem 
services, biodiversity offsets) open up new opportunities for capital accumulation.  
• GHG reductions will be achieved not by reduced consumption in the rich 
countries (shrinking markets and global trade, smaller economies, reduced energy 
and material throughputs in absolute terms), expansion of free time, and 
redistribution of wealth, but by greater energy efficiency, the use of new 
technologies (including technologies to capture or reuse greenhouse gasses) and 
expanded production of non-fossil fuel sources of energy.  On the contrary, 
demand for energy is projected to grow due to human population growth and 
economic ‘development’ in the global south. Increased demand for electricity is 
also predicted as a result of transition to electric vehicles.  
• Corporations, as well as international financial institutions, are the lead actors, 
supported by governments, in investing in R&D and ‘innovation’ (that will be 
commercialized and deployed mainly by corporations). There is no conflict 
between continued economic growth and ecological limits; all that is needed is a 
number of shifts in investment (e.g., carbon bonds, renewable energy markets) 
and technologies. Rich countries have a moral obligation to help transfer some of 
these technologies to poorer countries (but only limited obligations to transfer 
wealth, as we see in climate change negotiations at the international level).   
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• While a transition to renewable energies for electricity supply and other needs 
must be a medium-to-long-term goal, humankind will continue to rely upon fossil 
fuels (particularly, oil and gas) for many decades to come, since there are, as yet, 
no substitutes for certain uses of oil (especially in transportation), and because 
poor countries with large coal reserves (like India) have no more affordable means 
to fuel their economic development. Thus, it is only responsible on the part of 
large ‘energy’ corporations to continue to search for and develop oil and gas 
reserves (gas being a ‘bridge’ fuel), while improving the carbon footprint of such 
production and investing in renewables. Governments, meanwhile, should 
subsidize development of ‘clean energy’ technologies (such as CCS) to reduce 
emissions from fossil fuels as well as new fuel sources for transportation 
(biofuels).  
• Coal-fired electricity production should be cut back first, with natural gas being its 
primary medium-term substitute.  
• A large portion of the world’s population lacks the necessary energy to meet its 
basic needs and its development goals.  Global energy corporations seek to supply 
these needs by extracting and exporting fossil fuels as well as renewable energy 
components.  
• Corporations have been successful in securing compensation for ‘stranded assets,’ 
evading the deferred costs of resource extraction, and lobbying for downstream 
carbon taxes on the grounds that ‘we are all responsible, as consumers of energy, 
for climate change.’   
 
  This capitalist vision of the post-carbon future diverges radically from the green-
left vision of community-based production no longer dominated by global corporations 
and supply chains, oriented to meeting democratically-determined social needs, fuelled 
almost entirely by renewable sources of energy, and animated by values of eco-centrism, 
egalitarianism, and solidarity (including global citizenship).5 In green-left thinking, 
agency resides primarily in communities and governments, not large corporations, and 
the global crisis of justice (a term not found in climate capitalist discourse) requires an 
egalitarian rationing of the global carbon budget, along with a substantial transfer of 
resources to the poorest countries to finance low-carbon economic development and 
adaptation to the effects of climate change. While many grassroots organizations are 
                                                            
5 I recognize that ‘green-left’ is a wide umbrella and that there will be disagreements about which academic 
works, political parties, organizations, manifestos, and so on, fit under it.  I would include the works of 
ecological economists such as Alain Lipietz and Elmar Altvater, along with many other Marxist and post-
Marxist ecological thinkers, both inside and outside of Green parties around the world. In the Canadian 
context, green-left programmatic positions are being advanced today by the leader of the Green Party, 
Elizabeth May, some of the base of the NDP, Greenpeace and other ENGOs, and the authors of the LEAP 
manifesto (https://leapmanifesto.org/en/the-leap-manifesto/#manifesto-content). 
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calling for solutions that seem to imply a new order of global governance and regulation, 
global forums such as the CoPs are privileging the climate capitalist approaches.6 
  In the lead-up to the Paris CoP (held in December 2015), the President and CEO 
of TOTAL E&P Canada, Laurent Maurel, was invited to speak at an event at the 
University of Alberta organized by the French embassy in Canada.7 Mr. Maurel, whose 
company participates in the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) (discussed further, 
below), made many of the points that have become part of post-carbon capitalist 
discourse. He began by acknowledging to a large audience of the environmentally-
minded that the energy corporations are ‘part of the problem and . . . also part of the 
solution.’ In a context in which the world economy will continue to grow, he said, there 
will be concomitant demand for energy—especially in the global south. ‘Energy needs to 
be available to all the people on the planet, especially the 1.3 billion people who do not 
have basic access to electricity.’ He specifically mentioned the great need for more energy 
in Africa.8 Energy corporations are to industrialization of the global south, therefore, 
what the agribusiness corporations are to food production in the global south, that is, 
vectors of ‘development.’ Members of the OGCI, he said, are committed to reducing the 
GHG intensity of energy production, mainly by taking a ‘collective approach’ to the 
development of carbon capture and sequestration technology and other technologies 
(e.g., to stop methane leakage). They see increased production of natural gas as a 
replacement for a share of the world’s consumption of oil, and are ready to divest from 
coal.  They are diversifying their investments into solar energy production, biofuels, and 
biomass conversion. An example offered by Mr. Maurel was the 2011 acquisition by Total 
SA, Europe’s third-biggest oil producer, of 60 per cent of SunPower Corp. (the second-
largest U.S. solar panel maker).  
 The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative to which Mr. Maurel referred was formed in 
2014 during discussions at the World Economic Forum in Davos, initially bringing 
together six (notably, none US-based) oil and gas giants: Saudi Aramco, BG Group, Eni, 
PEMEX, Sinopec, and Total (Oil & Gas Climate Initiative 2014).  As of 2016, 
BP, CNPC, Reliance Industries, Repsol, Shell, and Statoil had also joined the group.9 
                                                            
6 The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, for example, was launched at the Paris CoP.  See: 
http://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/. 
7 The session, which was organized by the Science and Technology Secretary of the French Embassy in 
Canada and the European Union Centre of Excellence at the University of Alberta, may be viewed here: 
http://livestream.com/accounts/3923053/events/4407075/player?width=640&height=360&autoPlay=true&
mute=false. The panel presentations described in this article took place on 29 October 2015. The event was 
one of a number of ‘French Ameri-Can Climate Talks,’ organized by the French embassies in the United 
States and Canada.  
8 TOTAL, Maurel said, had initiated ‘a crowdfunding platform dedicated to access to clean energy . . . for 
the people who need it most.’ 
9 See http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/. BG Group has been acquired by Royal Dutch Shell since 
2014. 
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OGCI’s ‘Action Statement’ (2014) refers to its members’ ‘pivotal role in providing the 
adequate and affordable energy that has powered global prosperity,’ and their 
considerable investments in ‘finding effective solutions to environmental challenges.’  
The statement highlights technological solutions to climate change, specifically: energy 
efficiency, reduction of gas flaring and methane emissions, carbon capture and storage, 
the expanded role of natural gas and renewable energy.’  
 Elements of the capitalist post-carbon vision are found in corporate reports and 
statements by CEOS. Ben van Beurden, CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, for example, was 
quoted as saying that although solar energy will someday be ‘the backbone’ of world 
energy systems, this will not happen for decades, and that in the meantime there will be a 
need for oil to meet a doubling of world energy demand (Pashley 2015). Another Shell 
executive, quoted in the same article, suggested that switching production from ‘dirty coal 
to lesser-emitting gas or oil’ was the way to avoid surpassing the 2C temperature increase. 
In Total’s 2016 strategy paper, its CEO, Patrick Pouyanné, is quoted as saying:  
 
Steering investment in the private sector is vital if we want to keep global 
warming under 2°C. Putting a price on CO2 is the most efficient financial 
mechanism to change the rules of the game quickly. It’s a must in the 
energy sector. The main priority is to reduce the use of coal, which 
generates more emissions that any other type of energy, and to switch to 
gas and renewables for power generation. A carbon price of USD 30 to 
USD 40 per ton would make this possible. 
 
 In May 2015 the CEOs of BP, Shell, BG Group, Statoil, Eni, and Total wrote to the 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, reiterating points made in the 
OGCI statement, and calling on national governments to ‘introduce carbon pricing even-
handedly and eventually enable global linkage between national systems’ (Lund et al. 
2015). Shell’s 2016 global scenarios report frames the problem as the need to ‘decarbonise 
the global economy in a way that might address both the challenge of climate change and 
the need for broader economic growth.’10  
 The evidence so far suggests that it is the corporations based in the European 
Union that are leading the formulation of a long-term, carbon-constrained investment 
strategy with a view to making a sufficiently gradual transition to renewables so as to 
extract maximum revenue from their existing investments in oil, gas, and LNG 
production. Unlike US-based Exxon, they accept the writing on the wall with regard to 
the intensifying pressures from publics (particularly in Europe) for deeper and faster 
reductions of global GHG emissions. Their strategy may also be responsive to divestment 
                                                            
10 This statement is found in the summary of the report, at http://www.shell.com/energy-and-
innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/a-better-life-with-a-healthy-planet.html.  
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campaigns. The OGCI group does not have much to lose in the phasing out of coal 
production, and some of its members are already integrated into emissions-trading 
schemes or operating in jurisdictions with carbon taxes or levies. These corporations, 
unlike some of the smaller producers of oil and gas, seem well able to absorb the 
additional costs of carbon pricing without significant effects on their bottom lines. 
Indeed, there are important benefits, such as social license to operate. In addition, the 
financialization of carbon in the form of offsets and tradeable permits has created 
lucrative new markets.11 
 In the jurisdictions where large multinational oil and gas corporations operate, 
and where states are particularly reliant upon oil revenues, carbon price ceilings are being 
set in relation to so-called ‘carbon leakage’ thresholds. According to this economic 
hypothesis, if the price set for CO2eq emissions is ‘too high,’ large emitters will relocate 
production to jurisdictions where the price is lower (or non-existent). As a result, the 
GHGs will continue to be emitted, doing the planet no good, while the jurisdiction with 
the highest price on carbon will lose revenue it otherwise would have earned in royalties 
and taxes, along with jobs and income for its citizens.12 How carbon prices are set, and 
what constitutes a ‘too high’ price are mysterious matters, since carbon pricing regimes 
are created by governments, which are in turn responsive to lobbyists with structural 
power.  
 As we have seen in the cases of Shell and Total, the global energy corporations 
commonly cite the figure of USD 30 to 40 per tonne as an operative or predictable carbon 
price in the jurisdictions that have – or may soon have – some form of market-based 
policies to regulate GHGs. The calculations by corporate emitters of the ‘risk’ of carbon 
pricing vary depending on where they operate and the sectors they are in. A 2013 survey 
by Climate Disclosure Project (CDP) of 29 companies based or operating in the United 
States found a range of USD 6 to 60. Jurisdictions arrive at different carbon prices 
depending on the nature of their local economy and its leading industries, their 
motivation to reduce GHGs, and their negotiations with large emitters. Corporations 
have every incentive to exaggerate the burdens of policies that seek to internalize 
environmental costs and to threaten capital strikes or flight to bargain down these costs. 
                                                            
11 There is a mushrooming literature on the commodification of nature (including carbon markets) that I 
cannot review here. It is, however, a major element of climate capitalism, offering new opportunities for 
accumulation. See, e.g., Lohmann 2012. 
12 Given this logic, it is not surprising that the next step is to conclude that what is needed is a ‘global price’ 
on carbon. Christian de Perthuis (Climate Economics Chair at Paris-Dauphine University) and Jean Tirole 
(Toulouse School of Economics and Nobel Laureate 2014) called for the inclusion of the principle of a 
single world carbon price in the Paris CoP Agreement. This is also being talked about in terms of ‘linking’ 
regional carbon markets.  Rachel Tansey (2015), in a critical overview of the Sustainable Innovation Forum 
at the Paris CoP, raises the likelihood that this may well have the effect of driving down the global average 
price of carbon.   
11
ADKIN: Crossroads in Alberta 
Corporations, governments, and economists involved in price-setting (through the design 
of a new policy) attempt to calculate the average carbon price for the market in which the 
emitters operate and compete for market share. That average price generally becomes the 
ceiling for a new initiative, due to the carbon leakage hypothesis.  Thus, what is often 
represented as a ‘market determined’ carbon leakage threshold is in reality the outcome of 
prior political decisions by governments. The fact that carbon prices are, in most cases, 
far too low to achieve the emissions reductions that are necessary according to climate 
science, supports the conclusion that the predominant criterion for carbon pricing is the 
price ceiling acceptable to the regulated emitters.13  That price, in turn, is based on some 
calculation of the effects of carbon pricing on their rates of profit.  
 There is little evidence, to date, that environmental regulation has triggered 
significant capital flight or carbon leakage.  Economic modelling has been used to try to 
predict the effects of different carbon prices on investment decisions either on a sectoral 
or economy-wide basis, and is subject to a wide range of assumptions.  A recent report 
looking into claims of carbon leakage as a result of the EU’s ETS found no evidence of 
carbon leakage, although the reason for this may be the generous emissions permits 
handed out to EU emitters (ECORYS 2013). A study commissioned by the World Bank 
Group found that ‘empirical examinations tend to find limited evidence of carbon 
leakage’ (PMR 2015, 24). An OECD study, likewise, found that carbon pricing ‘promotes 
abatement,’ but has no measurable negative effect on the ‘competitiveness’ of regulated 
corporations (Arlinghaus 2015). The World Bank report observes that similar claims 
about environmental regulation causing firms to relocate investment to ‘pollution havens’ 
have been made ever since the 1970s, but that there has been little evidence to show that 
environmental costs have played a significant role in investment decisions (PMR 2015, 
25-26). On the contrary, the report highlights a study (Leiter et al. 2011) of the effects of 
environmental policy in 21 European countries on investment levels which found that 
‘higher environmental stringency is associated with increased, rather than decreased, 
investment levels’ (26). In a review of studies relevant to the carbon leakage question, 
economist Larry Karp concluded that modelling results are contradictory and that 
empirical data are insufficient to establish a predictable magnitude of leakage (Karp 2010, 
33-34). His best guess was that ‘leakage will be small or moderate’ (34). The World Bank 
report authors suggest that this uncertainty, combined with ‘the political economy of 
                                                            
13 Even in Sweden, where the general carbon tax implemented in 1991 rose from 29€ to 125€ in 2014, and is 
considered to be the highest carbon tax in any country, industry was taxed at only 50 per cent of this rate, 
and electricity used in the industrial sector was not taxed. Emitters covered by the EU’s ETS were not 
subject to the carbon tax. Fossil fuels were heavily taxed in the 1980s—especially petrol. Almost all of 
Sweden’s electricity by 1999 came from nuclear, hydro, or biomass sources. With a combination of multiple 
taxes on CO2, fuels, and pollutants along with energy efficiency programs, Sweden reduced its GHG 
emissions by 23 per cent from 1990 to 2013.  See: Johannson 2001; Andersson and Lövin 2015. 
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lobbying,’ make it likely that the threat of carbon leakage ‘will remain an important part 
of carbon pricing policy despite the generally weak evidence’ (PMR 2015, 27). 
In other words, ‘carbon leakage’ is a new variant of earlier corporate threats of 
disinvestment in response to environmental regulation. It is essentially synonymous with 
the use of the more euphemistic term ‘competitiveness’ by large corporations and their 
lobbying associations.14 The ‘concerns’ expressed by industry spokespersons, whether 
publicly or behind closed doors (lobbying), have an effective disciplining role on 
governments.   
 What governments, corporations, and economists do not want to say is that the 
full internalisation of the environmental costs of production would make many firms 
unprofitable, as this would be equivalent to acknowledging the conflict between 
capitalism and ecological sustainability that sustainable development discourse tries so 
insistently to erase. An adequate response to global warming requires political action and 
structural change of the kind that few governments are prepared to engage. Such action 
could range from the use of fiscal and regulatory policies to effect rapid transition to 
‘mixed ownership’ post-carbon economies to the extensive use of public ownership of 
productive and financial capital. There are costs and obstacles to account for with regard 
to such strategies, not least of which is the WTO regime. Nor does a sub-national 
jurisdiction like Alberta have at its disposal all of the levers of change that are available to 
a national government. It is to the Alberta context that I now turn. 
  
Climate Capitalism and Climate Change Policy in Alberta 
 
‘Climate capitalism,’ as mentioned above, gives a central place to technological 
innovation as the magic formula for reconciling growth in fossil fuels extraction and 
exports with reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (the ‘greening of energy production,’ 
or ‘reducing the GHG intensity of the global energy mix’), with such innovation being 
substantially subsidized by governments. This element of climate capitalism has certainly 
been a pillar of the Progressive Conservative (PC) governments’ climate change policy in 
Alberta since the 1990s (Adkin 2014; Adkin and Stares 2016). The ‘innovation’ 
corporations established by the PC government in 2010 have pursued this agenda in their 
funding of corporate-university research partnerships. The CEO of Alberta Innovates – 
Energy and Environment Solutions (AI—EES), argued at a forum in October 2015 that 
the ‘key’ to making Alberta’s oil sands production environmentally sustainable was 
                                                            
14 ‘Competitiveness’ appears 17 times in the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers’ submission to 
the Alberta Climate Change Advisory Panel: CAPP, October 1, 2015,  
file:///J:/publications/climate%20policy%20Alberta%20paper/CAPP%20submission%20to%20AB%20Clima
te%20Panel%202015.pdf. On ‘competitiveness’ discourse in relation to Canadian climate change policy, see 
Blair 2012. 
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‘disruptive technology and innovation.’15 He highlighted the potential of CCS, small 
modular nuclear reactors (to supply energy to the oil sands upgraders), and CO2 
‘utilisation,’ as well as technologies that promise to reduce water use in the oil sands. The 
Alberta government has been a strong proponent of CCS, in particular, as the solution to 
GHG emission concerns (Adkin and Stares 2016). In response to a statement by an 
audience member associated with EcoJustice that we need ‘democratic’ solutions that 
empower local communities rather than relying upon business, Isaac insisted ‘we can 
make business our friend . . . because they have the capacity to make the transformations 
that are needed. They are the ones that can invest.’  
 In its brief to Alberta’s Climate Change Advisory Panel, the Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) argued that a much better alternative to increasing 
‘climate-related cost burdens’ on the oil and gas industry would be to ‘focus on 
technology and innovation enhancement.’ CAPP clearly assumes that such investment 
will take the form of ‘partnerships’ between ‘industry and government.’ Large emitters 
have benefited from grants from the Climate Change Emissions Management Fund 
(CCEMF). CAPP also proposes a ‘clean infrastructure’ royalty credit program as an 
incentive for the further ‘uptake of clean technologies’ (CAPP 2015, 21). It asks for the 
loosening up and expansion of the Scientific Research and Experimental Development 
Tax Credit (21-22) and the doubling of the funding to another royalty credit program, the 
Innovative Energy Technologies Program (22). In addition, CAPP proposes yet another 
government-funded research institution that would focus on ‘R&D into conventional oil 
and natural gas production and environmental performance,’ thereby complementing the 
R&D already funded by Alberta Innovates (23).  
 The PCs’ framework for GHG reduction, put in place by the Klein and Stelmach 
governments, consisted (in addition to the ‘technology and innovation’ pillar described 
above), of a requirement that the emitters of more than 100,000 tons of CO2eq per year 
reduce their emissions intensity (i.e., the CO2eq emitted per unit of production, such as a 
barrel of oil) by 12 per cent per year, beginning in 2007. The Climate Change and 
Emissions Management Act created a CCEM Fund into which large emitters have, since 
2009, paid a fee per tonne of GHG emissions exceeding their annual emissions intensity 
reduction requirement. The Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) set out three 
options for companies to comply with their emissions intensity reduction requirements 
(in addition to actually reducing their on-site emissions): purchase of an offset within 
Alberta; payment into the CCEM Fund (at $15 per tonne of CO2) for a credit; or the 
procurement of an emissions performance credit from another facility that has reduced 
its emissions by more than the required amount.16 Under this system, Alberta’s GHGs 
                                                            
15 This was the forum described in note 7.  
16 Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, Alta Reg 139/2007, http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/laws/regu/alta-reg-
139-2007/latest/alta-reg-139-2007.html. 
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have grown from an estimated 234 megatonnes (mt) in 2005 to 274 mt in 2015, with most 
of the emissions growth coming from the oil sands. If the Alberta government’s claims 
about its climate change plan in 2002 had been realized, the province’s total emissions in 
2020 would be 218 mt. They are instead expected to be closer to 290 mt.17 
 In the summer of 2015 the NDP Minister of Environment and Parks appointed 
the Alberta Climate Leadership Panel, chaired by an energy economist from the 
University of Alberta’s School of Business. After a highly compressed public and 
stakeholder consultation period, the Panel issued its report in November. The 
government immediately accepted most of its recommendations, without further public 
consultation. Among the measures that the Alberta government delegation carried to 
Paris in December were: 
 
• a $30 per tonne price for regulated CO2e emissions, justified as the upper limit 
before carbon leakage (disinvestment) will occur (Climate Panel 2015, 11) 
• coal-powered electricity production will be phased out by 2030 (with 
compensation for the plant owners) 
• emissions from expanding oil sands production will be permitted to rise to a 
ceiling of 100 mt from their current level of 70 mt (Government of Alberta 2015) 
• a 45 per cent reduction in methane gas emissions from Alberta’s oil and gas 
operations by 2025 
• a target for renewables as a share of provincial energy supply of 30 per cent by 
2030 
 
A year into its mandate, the NDP government also passed The Climate Leadership 
Implementation Act, which set a $20 per tonne carbon “levy” (the term “tax” was avoided) 
effective January 1, 2017; this rate will be raised to $30 per tonne January 1, 2018 (Alberta 
2016a). The carbon levy will be included in the price of all fuels that emit greenhouse 
gases when combusted (including transportation and heating fuels such as diesel, 
gasoline, natural gas and propane). It will not apply directly to consumer purchases of 
electricity, to the “specified gas emitters” (large emitters that are covered by the SGER), to 
fuel used by farmers for farm operations, or to other exempted groups/uses. The large 
industrial emitters will continue to be subject to the SGER framework until the end of 
2017, when product and sector-based performance standards will be introduced (as 
recommended by the Alberta Climate Leadership Panel).  In the meantime, the emissions 
intensity requirement has been increased to 15 per cent per year (from 12 per cent), and 
the price per tonne for emissions exceeding this target was increased to $20 (from $15) in 
2016 and to $30 as of January 2017.  
                                                            
17These figures from Environment and Climate Change Canada, http://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-
indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=18F3BB9C-1 (accessed June 2016). 
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 The government has also mandated, through The Climate Leadership 
Implementation Act, that all revenue collected through the carbon levy will be used only 
for ‘initiatives related to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases or supporting Alberta’s 
ability to adapt to climate change, or to provide rebates or adjustments related to the 
carbon levy to consumers, businesses and communities, including adjustments in the 
form of tax credits or tax rate reductions’ (‘Purpose’ 3.2). With the aim of mitigating 
social inequality effects, the government has chosen to rebate the carbon levy to taxpayers 
according to income, and estimates that 60 per cent of households will receive some 
annual rebate.  
 Schedule 2 of the Act established the Energy Efficiency Alberta (EEA) crown 
corporation with a mandate ‘(a) to raise awareness among energy consumers of energy 
use and the associated economic and environmental consequences,  (b) to promote, 
design and deliver programs and carry out other activities related to energy efficiency, 
energy conservation and the development of micro-generation and small scale energy 
systems in Alberta, and  (c) to promote the development of an energy efficiency services 
industry’ (Bill 20, Schedule 2, Art. 2 (2)(a)). The EEA will be funded by a portion of the 
new carbon levy, with a budget for 2017-2022 estimated at $645 million (Government of 
Alberta 2016a). 
 This is an impressive body of actions for a new government inheriting a long-
entrenched conservative-appointed senior civil service and an understaffed Ministry of 
Environment (Adkin 2016). The government’s measures have faced vocal opposition 
from the Wildrose Party which constructs the carbon levy as a cruel tax on Albertan 
families during a period of economic recession (which is also blamed on the NDP 
government). A number of the large oil and gas corporations operating in the province 
have, on the contrary, supported the NDP’s climate policies. How should we assess the 
policy, as it has been rolled out to date, in relation to the climate capitalist and green-left, 
or deep decarbonisation paths that I have outlined above? 
 From the perspective of the global climate crisis and the inadequacy of the 
commitments made at the Paris CoP, it is questionable whether Alberta’s current suite of 
policies will amount to a ‘fair share’ of the burden of GHG reductions. According to the 
Alberta Climate Leadership Panel’s report, the implementation of its recommendations 
will result in the continuing rise of the province’s total emissions (as a result, mainly, of 
rising emissions from the oil sands) until 2020. Thereafter, a gradual decline is expected, 
with emissions returning to their 2015 level (or 270 mt) by 2030.  Beyond 2030, no 
predictions have been made nor targets set. Compare this commitment to Canada’s 2002 
commitment under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions by 6 per cent 
of 1990 level by 2012. Had Alberta adopted and implemented this target, its 1990 GHGs 
of 175 mt would have fallen to 164.5 mt by 2012. If Alberta were held to the IPCC target 
of a 25-40 per cent reduction below 1990 by 2030, and were it to aim, moderately, to 
reduce its emissions by 30 per cent, its emissions in 2030 would be 122 mt.  Looking 
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ahead to 2050, the EU has adopted a target of an 80 per cent reduction below 1990, and 
the Deep Decarbonisation Pathways Project (DDPP), ‘taking seriously what is needed to 
limit global warming to 2 °C or less,’ has recommended a target of an 87 per cent 
reduction over 2010 by 2050. In the first scenario, Alberta’s emissions would plummet to 
35 mt, and in the second, to 31 mt.  At present, neither Canada nor Alberta has any plan 
to achieve such a massive reduction of its GHG emissions.  
 It is frequently argued by economists and politicians that Alberta should not be 
held to such targets because of the heavy reliance of its economy on fossil fuel extraction, 
which is carbon-intensive. Moreover, adopting a carbon price that would bring emissions 
down faster (which most economists estimate to be $100 per tonne or more) is ruled out 
on the grounds that it would result only in carbon leakage.  Among the many possible 
responses to the first argument is the ethical argument that the burden of stopping the 
global temperature rise must be shared equally. The UN’s Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN), in conjunction with the Institute for Sustainable 
Development and International Relations (IDDRI) have calculated that, taking the global 
carbon budget (measured in tonnes of CO2eq) required to limit temperature changes to 2 
°C in 2050 and dividing this by a forecast of the world’s population, global per capita 
emissions of GHGs must be no greater than 1.7 tonnes by 2050. Even if the planet 
achieves this, there is still only a 66 per cent chance of staying below the 2 °C threshold 
(Bataille et al. 2015, 12-13).  As the DDPP’s 2015 Canada report concludes: ‘This DDPC 
implies dramatic reductions in GHG emissions in Canada, where per capita emissions are 
presently 21 tonnes, with our analysis and modelling indicating that this is truly a stretch 
scenario relative to current and forecast policy stringency’ (Bataille et al. 2015, 13, italics 
added).   
 The authors of the Canada report do not, however, consider the task to be 
impossible. Their package of policies includes: ‘best-in-class regulations that strengthen 
existing policies for the electricity, buildings and transport sectors,’ a cap and trade 
system to drive abatement in heavy industry and oil and gas, and a ‘complementary 
carbon price on the rest of the economy that essentially mops up reductions to reach 
areas where the regulations do not go, and returns the revenues to reduced income and 
corporate taxes’ (Ibid. 13). If Albertans do not reduce their per capita emissions of GHGs 
to their equal global share, it means that people elsewhere will have to reduce theirs by 
more than their equal global share. Canadians are, overall, much better positioned in 
terms of human capital, scientific capital, and natural resources to achieve such targets 
than are populations in many other parts of the world. These are the kinds of arguments 
made in the green-left LEAP manifesto. 
 Regarding the carbon leakage argument, which the NDP government appears to 
have accepted, the $30 CAD ceiling price on carbon recommended by the Climate Panel 
was not explained, leaving us to assume that it was based on a survey of prices in other 
jurisdictions where heavy oil is produced (and might attract investment away from 
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Alberta).18 No doubt the Panel also heard from corporate ‘stakeholders’ during its 
‘technical’ meetings with industry representatives in 2015 regarding the carbon price 
range that would be acceptable to them. In its brief to the Climate Change Advisory Panel 
the CAPP stated: ‘The sector is highly competitive, and there are many producers 
operating in a variety of basins around the world producing comparable products. 
Alberta (and Canada) needs to offer fiscal terms that are competitive with other 
jurisdictions to ensure industry activity in Canada remains viable’ (CAPP 2015, 25). 
CAPP uses the carbon leakage argument in its brief (Ibid., 26-27). Yet whether the 
corporations that have invested heavily in capital-intensive bitumen extraction are in any 
position to cut their losses and transfer investment to other sites of heavy oil production 
(e.g., in Mexico, Venezuela, or Saskatchewan) is a question that calls for serious 
examination. Companies that have already sunk capital in the oil sands are likely less 
‘mobile’ than corporate rhetoric suggests. A bigger obstacle to investment in Alberta’s oil 
sands is the opposition to new pipeline capacity to the west and the east. Citing 
frustration with the delayed approval of the pipeline, CNPC International (a subsidiary of 
the China National Petroleum Corp.) withdrew from the Northern Gateway pipeline 
project in 2007 and turned to Venezuela, instead, as a source of crude oil (Lorenz 2007). 
More generally, low oil prices make investment in high-cost non-conventional oil 
extraction unattractive to investors. In October 2015, with no sign of a price recovery, a 
New York Times story reported: 
 
Since the price collapse, Teck Resources has delayed the start of its 
oilsands project by five years to 2026. Cenovus Energy substantially 
reduced budgets for its long-term developments. And Osum Oil Sands has 
set aside some of the expansion planned for a project it purchased from 
Shell last year. The Chinese-owned company Nexen, which had its 
oilsands production curtailed by regulators for about a month in August 
because of a pipeline leak, has deferred plans to build another upgrader 
facility, where tar-like bitumen of the oilsands is converted into synthetic 
crude oil, until the end of 2020 (Austen 2015). 
 
 Following the Paris CoP, Shell and Total released strategic investment reports that 
reassured shareholders that their investment portfolios are ‘resilient’ vis-à-vis the 
predicted environmental costs (and low prices) of extracting non-conventional oil. Total, 
which has four facilities in the Athabasca oil sands (Surmont, Fort Hills, Joslyn, and 
Northern Lights), as well as several exploration leases, announced in its May 2016 
strategy paper, Integrating Climate into our Strategy, that it would be reducing its 
exposure in the oil sands and that it would not be pursuing exploration in the Arctic. 
                                                            
18 The term carbon leakage is used only once in the Panel’s report, on p. 11.  
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In today’s challenging production environment, we are prioritizing our 
projects and focusing on moderately priced production and processing assets 
that meet the highest environmental and safety standards. On that basis, in 
2015 we decided to reduce our exposure in Canada’s oil sands, which are 
particularly expensive to develop and operate (26, italics added).  
 
At the same time, Total—along with other oil sands producers like Shell and Suncor—
affirmed its support for carbon pricing. Total’s 2016 strategy paper stated that it applies 
‘an internal CO2 price of USD 30 to USD 40, depending on the oil price scenario or the 
actual price if it is higher in a given country, when evaluating our investments. This is 
consistent with our support for mechanisms to replace coal with gas in power generation 
and our investment in R&D on low-carbon technologies’ (Ibid., 26). 
Alberta’s foreign-owned oil and gas giants have not (at least publicly) protested 
the moderate proposals for pricing carbon that were made by the Climate Panel in 
November 2015. Indeed, the NDP’s measures to date, insofar as they affect profit levels in 
the oil and gas sector, may be less costly to the industry than those that were being 
considered by the Redford government in 2013 (Dyer 2013; McCarthy et al. 2013; 
Mitchelmore 2015; Mandel 2016). The crisis of profitability the oil sands producers face 
at present is due to factors that are not unique to Alberta, but are common to all 
producers of high-cost non-conventional fossil fuels in a low-price era brought on by 
over-production. Given the global prognosis for ‘peak fossil fuels’ set out in the first 
section of this article, the primary question for the Alberta government is not whether a 
higher carbon levy for large emitters will result in carbon leakage, but what will take the 
place of the oil sands in the province’s economy within the next 20 years. 
  
A crossroads for the climate and for the left in Alberta 
 
Humankind has reached a critical crossroads: One road leads in the direction of 
shallow decarbonisation, intensifying climate change feedback effects, and worsening 
global economic insecurity and political instability. This road will be one of market-
driven politics that privilege capital accumulation, but its sign-posts will read ‘providing 
energy to the world,’ ‘clean energy,’ and ‘sustainable growth and prosperity.’ This is the 
path of climate capitalism.   
Another road leads in the direction of deep decarbonisation and shrinking 
opportunities for capital accumulation, underpinned by new forms of democratic 
governance. We could call this ecological democracy. Achieving deep decarbonisation in 
the next 20 to 30 years will not be possible using the carbon pricing that has been 
implemented or proposed to date. A transition on this scale using ‘market based’ 
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approaches would require such approaches to be driven by ecological imperatives rather 
than constrained by corporate threats to relocate investment to under-regulated 
jurisdictions. Governments have a number of ways to counter such corporate power, 
including the renegotiation of trade and investment agreements (or their abrogation), 
efforts to secure stronger international environmental agreements, investment in a 
parallel, publicly-owned, renewables-based economy, and expropriation of corporate 
assets. A state like Norway’s has given itself considerable leverage to determine the rate of 
resource exploitation and to appropriate the wealth produced, by maintaining a 
dominant role for public exploitation of its off-shore oil reserves.  Thanks to the decisions 
made by its Social Credit and Conservative governments from the 1940s onward (Pratt 
1976; Richards and Pratt 1981) Alberta has never asserted majority public ownership of 
productive capacity in the oil and gas sector. Its rentierism has been based on an 
increasingly shrinking share of resource rents paid by large private corporations 
dominated by US capital (Campanella 2012; Roy 2015). In January 2016, following a 
review of the province’s royalties regime, and in the context of the collapse of oil prices 
and strong industry pressure, the Notley government decided not to increase royalty rates 
for oil and gas producers.19  
By virtue of being a Canadian province and subject to the international trade and 
investment treaties to which neoliberal Canadian governments have signed on, the 
expropriation of energy corporation assets now would incur massive market and 
‘constitutional’ retaliation (e.g., lawsuits under NAFTA) on the part of bond holders and 
investors.20 In any case, assets in the oil sands are beginning to look less and less 
attractive. In this context, what levers are available to the NDP government of Alberta to 
raise revenue and use it to rapidly shift investment away from the fossil fuels industries 
toward sustainable agriculture and urban design, renewable energy substitution, and 
other leading sectors of an alternative development model? What other resources can be 
mobilized by the state and civil society to effect a green transition? These are hard 
questions that call for ‘practical’ answers (Williams 1989). However, the answers cannot 
wait. To secure this opening for change and extend it into the future the immediate 
political-economic crisis of sustainable livelihoods and income security must be met head 
on with rapid new job creation and income redistribution.21  
                                                            
19 Video press conference with the Premier, 29 January 2016.            
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FtpjaqGay5o. Accessed 18 February 2016. 
20 During the recent US Presidential election campaign, Donald Trump claimed that he would tear up or 
renegotiate NAFTA but it is impossible to know at this time what this may mean for Canada. 
21 The unemployment rate in Alberta has risen from 4.7% in December 2014 to 8.5% in October 2016. The 
last time the unemployment rate in Alberta was above 7.0% was in April 2010. The unemployment rate in 
Canada as a whole in October 2016 was 7.0 %. Sources: Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, December 
2015, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/160108/dq160108a-eng.htm; Statistics Canada, CANSIM, 
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How Government Can Lead 
 
 Government does have the authority to take the lead in comprehensive planning 
for green transition. Ecological and equity criteria, along with food self-sufficiency, 
employment-generation, and respect for aboriginal rights must guide every area of 
government policy. For this to happen democratically, the government must invest in 
public education (about the stakes, the options, the benefits of energy transition), and in 
the meaningful involvement of citizens and communities in decision-making. A 
mobilizing, inspirational politics of principles is called for that speaks to global and 
intergenerational equity. Beyond this, we need a vision of the better world we will win. 
The transition we are facing should be presented as an opportunity to create a society that 
brings us greater security, well-being, and happiness.   
  The NDP’s key resources lie in the civil service and in civil society.  The capacity 
of the civil service, combined with the knowledge and research resources in civil society 
(think tanks, unions, universities, NGOs, indigenous peoples) should be supported and 
mobilized to undertake comprehensive planning for a green transition.  The government 
has been gradually rebuilding the policy capacity of ministries, including by hiring leaders 
from civil society organizations who have been engaged in these issues for many years. It 
is, however, constrained by the current fiscal environment in regard to expansion of the 
public service. One recent move has created a possible revenue stream that the 
government could use to multiply its policy and planning, as well as its public 
involvement resources. Its Climate Leadership Implementation Act, passed in May 2016, 
amended the Climate Change Emissions Management Act to permit the CCEM Fund to 
be used for: 
 
(g.1) education initiatives, including education programs, research 
programs and scholarships; (g.2) outreach initiatives, including initiatives 
to provide information to stakeholders and the public; (g.3) reimbursing 
salaries, fees, expenses, liabilities or other costs incurred by the 
Government in respect of activities or functions related to reducing 
emissions of specified gases or supporting Alberta’s ability to adapt to 
climate change; (g.4) funding salaries, fees, expenses, liabilities or other 
costs incurred by a Provincial corporation or the Independent System 
Operator in respect of activities or functions related to reducing emissions 
of specified gases or supporting Alberta’s ability to adapt to climate change 
(Government of Alberta 2016b, 94). 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
table 282-0087 (accessed 25 November 2016); Government of Alberta, 
http://economicdashboard.alberta.ca/Unemployment#alberta (accessed 25 November 2016). 
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 While the new carbon levy has attracted most of the attention of the opposition 
parties, these changes may be subversive of the hegemony of oil and gas industry interests 
in ways that are more important. The CCEM fund may provide a source of revenue to 
carry out the kind of public education and consultation initiatives that will be critical to 
garnering support for reforms in the direction of deep decarbonisation – should the 
government choose to undertake these.  Funding for research programs and scholarships 
may be directed to post-secondary institutions where research capacity already exists, and 
may be mobilized to advance green transition priorities. Because previous government 
funding priorities (both federal and provincial) heavily favoured R & D related to fossil 
fuels (Adkin 2016b), Alberta’s post-secondary institutions structured their hiring and 
grant-seeking accordingly to maximize their funding and endowments. If governments 
establish new “green transition” priorities for their funding agencies, university hiring 
and research priorities will shift accordingly, and research capacity that was under-
resourced will be tapped. The CCEM Corporation could also be redirected by the 
government to prioritize investment in R & D in energy efficiency and renewable energy 
systems, rather than the fossil-fuel-related or biofuels projects that it has prioritized since 
2009 (Adkin and Stares 2016).  
 In addition, the government is in the process of amalgamating the Alberta 
Innovates corporations created by the PC government in 2009-2010, and this could be an 
important opportunity to redefine funding priorities and to shift funding from industry-
university partnerships to community-university partnerships. Communities could 
include municipal governments, community leagues, First Nations and Metis settlements, 
and organizations working on everything from local food production to co-operative 
investment in passive housing developments.  
 These developments, if well co-ordinated and focused, could go a long way toward 
building a robust research and planning capacity to feed into and accelerate government 
policy development and the implementation of green transition strategies. However, the 
governmental and corporate understanding of “innovation,” with its focus on 
commercializable technology, must be changed to encompass innovation with regard to 
institutional design, political decision-making processes, participatory citizenship, public 
policy, and cultural transformation. This is the kind of knowledge produced by the 
comparatively underfunded social sciences and humanities, in conjunction with social 
movements and communities, and researchers in these fields are also eager to participate 
in interdisciplinary work that will move our societies and economies in the direction of 
ecological democracy.   
  Every opportunity should be taken to prioritize public investment in new job-
creating areas such as ecologically sustainable agriculture, value-added manufacturing, 
renewable energy production, energy conservation, as well as education and human 
services. Alternative employment needs to be created before growing unemployment can 
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be exploited further by the right and become a drain on revenue.  Government should 
seriously consider public ownership of new growth sectors (in lieu of subsidies to the 
private sector) as well as support for community-based planning and management of 
resources and services. 
 It bears repeating that the messaging from the government to the public about the 
public interest and the future of Alberta must change. NDP leaders continue to repeat the 
assertions of their PC predecessors that growth of oil and gas extraction is both critical to 
Albertans’ future prosperity and can be made environmentally sustainable. Action on 
climate change is presented as a condition for securing social license for the oil and gas 
companies.  Such messages are found in this speech by Premier Notley to the Edmonton 
Chamber of Commerce, April 15, 2016:22 
 
Our Climate Leadership Strategy is about responsible energy production. 
It is showing the world that we are committed to being one of the most 
environmentally responsible energy producers in the world. It will help 
open new markets for our products, and ensure Albertans get full value 
from the energy we sell. But first, we need the infrastructure to get our 
energy to new customers. Market access is so important to the future of 
Alberta and of our country. And pipelines are the safest and most 
environmentally responsible way to transport oil. As I said last weekend, 
and as I have been saying for months:  I will continue to advocate for 
pipelines until we get to “yes” so that Albertans – and all Canadians – get 
full value from our resources. 
 
The ‘last weekend’ to which the Premier referred was the federal NDP convention, held in 
Edmonton in April 2016, which was the occasion of a visceral split in the party between 
so-called ‘pragmatic’ and ‘radical’ factions. The provocation for this split was a debate 
about whether or not the party should adopt the left-green LEAP manifesto. The Alberta 
Premier and her cabinet were firmly opposed to the manifesto’s rejection of new fossil 
fuel infrastructure, instead reiterating Alberta’s demands for new pipeline capacity to 
carry bitumen and other products to ‘tidewater’ for export. Although there is not space 
here to examine the manifesto or the debate in detail, the fracture lines closely followed 
the opposition between climate capitalist and green-left visions that I have mapped in this 
article.   
  A government seeking rapid and deep decarbonisation with a just transition for 
directly affected workers needs a new discourse about the public interest and a new 
construction of Albertans’ identity. Rather than presenting action on climate change as a 
condition for securing national and international social license for the export of bitumen 
                                                            
22 http://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=41590B28C3B56-E600-600A-D5B848FB7DFCCD90. 
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and crude oil, political leaders need to represent decarbonisation as the building of a new 
future for ourselves, and a form of solidarity with others. Central Canadians and 
environmentalists are not Albertans’ enemies when they decline to help us prolong our 
fossil-fuel-extraction-based economy. We need a new collective identity—one that speaks 
to our role as global citizens and creators of a better world. How can Alberta be a model 
for the world? If Alberta can build a post-carbon economy with greater self-sufficiency 
and resilience for its communities, so can the rest of the world. Building support for this 
complex, collective transformation of our economy and our society requires government 
to lead as an educator and as a mobilizer of public involvement. The government can 
move in these ways to democratize our political institutions. 
  
What civil society actors can do 
 
The high-level principles of the Leap Manifesto, linking social justice demands to 
rapid green transition, need to be concretized for regions and communities. Civil society 
organizations can engage their members and networks to participate in decision-making, 
research, and planning processes. They can continue to build programmatic convergence 
and consensus within civil society, using conferences, media, and cross-sectoral working 
groups like the Alberta Green Economy Network (http://www.albertagen.ca/). The 
unions, along with progressive think-tanks, First Nations, Metis Settlements, academics, 
environmental, sustainable food, and anti-poverty organizations, and groups like Iron 
and Earth (http://www.ironandearth.org/) all have important roles to play in identifying a 
future path of development for Alberta.23 None of us, alone, has all of the expertise 
needed to produce adequate answers to these complex problems; that is why we need to 
collaborate and build coalitions.  
 At the same time, civil society actors must preserve their autonomy from the 
NDP/government while partnering with it wherever their goals converge. Their vision of 
ecological democracy must not be muted by, or subordinated to, electoral politics or party 
loyalty. The government could help to deepen and broaden a green public by removing 
obstacles to organizing and contributing resources; but regardless of what the 
government chooses to do, civil society actors must try in whatever ways possible to shift 
the political consensus. Without a mobilized green public, no progressive government 
can hope to stand up to the attacks that will surely come from corporate interests and the 
populist right.  
 We have no time to lose following a climate capitalist path that seeks to keep the 
old model running with some repairs and new paint. As Naomi Klein puts it, ‘there are 
no non-radical options left’ for acting effectively to stop climate change and to create a 
                                                            
23 There is unfortunately no space here to provide a detailed picture of the terrain in this regard, and much 
of this research remains to be done. For one recent study, see Haluza-DeLay and Carter 2016.  
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livable world.24 The current junction is one of enormous potential for change in Alberta, 
and the decisions taken now will determine whether climate change policy becomes the 
driver of a new model of development or a prop to the old one. 
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